Exchanging gradients is a widely used method in modern multi-node machine learning system (e.g., distributed training, collaborative learning). For a long time, people believed that gradients are safe to share: i.e., the training data will not be leaked by gradient exchange. However, we show that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly shared gradients. We name this leakage as Deep Leakage from Gradient and empirically validate the effectiveness on both computer vision and natural language processing tasks. Experimental results show that our attack is much stronger than previous approaches: the recovery is pixelwise accurate for images and token-wise matching for texts. We want to raise people's awareness to rethink the gradient's safety. Finally, we discuss several possible strategies to prevent such deep leakage. The most effective defense method is gradient pruning.
Introduction
Distributed training becomes necessary to deal with large-scale datasets. In a distributed training system, model parameters are shared across worker nodes and the updates are synchronized via passing gradients (parameter server [14, 22] , all reduce [3, 29] ). The distribution of computation naturally leads to the splitting of data: Each client stores a subset of the training data, and only communicates the model and the gradient. Such a framework allows to train a model using data from multiple sources without centralizing the training data [16, 17, 19, 25] . This scheme is named as collaborative learning and widely used when the data contains private information. For example, multiple hospitals can jointly train a model without sharing their patients' medical data.
Distributed training and collaborative learning have been widely used in recent large scale machine learning. However, does the "gradient sharing" scheme protects the training datasets of participants? In most scenarios, people assume that gradients are safe to share and will not expose the training data. More recent studies show that gradients reveal some properties of the training data, for example, property classifier [26] (whether a data point with certain property is in the batch) and using generative adversarial networks (GAN) that can generate pictures looks similar to the training images [8, 12, 26] . Here we consider a more challenging case: can we completely steal the training data from gradients? Formally, given differentiable machine learning model F () and its weights W , if we have the corresponding gradients ∇w w.r.t a pair of inputs and labels, can we obtain the pair of training data from gradients? Conventional wisdom would suggest that the answer is no, but we show that this is actually possible.
In this work, we demonstrate the Deep Leakage from Gradients (DLG): sharing the gradients will leak the private training data. We present an optimization algorithm that can obtain both the training inputs and the labels in just few iterations. To perform the attack, we first randomly generate a pair of "dummy" inputs and labels and then execute the usual forward and backward. After deriving the dummy gradients from the dummy data, instead of optimizing model weights as typical training, we optimize dummy inputs and labels to minimize the distance between dummy gradients and real When performing centralized training, the parameter server is capable to steal all training data from gradients received from worker nodes. While training in a decentralized manner (e.g., ring all reduce [29] ), any participant can be malicious and steal the training data from its neighbors.
gradients (illustrated in Fig. 2 ). When the optimization finishes, the private training data (both inputs and labels) is fully leaked. Notably, the whole process requires no extra prior about the training set.
Compared to weak attacks in previous studies (property inference [26, 32] and generative model [12] using class labels), such deep leakage from gradients is first discovered and raises people's awareness of rethinking the safety of gradients. In centralized distributed training (Fig. 1a) , parameter server, which usually does not store any training data, is able to steal local training data of all participants. For decentralized distributed training (Fig. 1b) , it is even worse because any participant can steal its neighbors' training data as long as he attempts to do that.
Compared with previous methods requires label information to generate similar images, our attack is an optimization process and does not depend on any generative models; therefore, DLG has two significant advantages. (i). DLG does not require label information, instead, can infer what the original class labels are from shared gradients. (ii). The results produced by DLG (both images and texts) are the exact original training samples instead of synthetic look-alike alternatives. We evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm on both vision (image classification) and language tasks (masked language model). On various datasets and tasks, DLG fully recovers the training data in few gradient steps.
The deep leakage puts a challenge to the multi-node machine learning system. The fundamental gradient sharing scheme, as shown in our work, is not always reliable. To prevent the deep leakage, we demonstrate three defense strategies: gradient perturbation, half precision, and gradient compression. For gradient perturbation, we find both Gaussian and Laplacian noise with a scale higher than 10
would be a good defense. While half precision fails to protect, gradient compression successfully defends the attack with the pruned gradient is more than 20%.
Our contributions include:
• DLG can obtain the original training data from the gradients (every pixel for image and every word for texts), instead of partial properties or synthetic alternatives. To our best knowledge, DLG is the first algorithm achieving it.
• Conventional approaches usually need extra information to perform the leakage (e.g., the corresponding labels and ), but DLG does not depend on a such prior and only requires the gradients.
• We analyze the attack difficulties in various settings and discuss several defense strategies against the deep leakage.
Related Work

Distributed Training
Training large machine learning models (e.g., deep neural networks) is computationally intensive. In order to speedup the training process, many studies worked on improving the parallelism of distributed training. There are many work improving the scalability of distributed training, both at the framework level [1, 2, 5, 28, 31] and at the algorithm level [6, 10, 15, 22, 30, 30] .
In general, distributed training can be classified into two categories: with a parameter server (centralized) [14, 18, 22] and without a parameter server (decentralized) [3, 29, 31] ). In both schemes, each node first performs the computation to refine its local copy of the model, and then sends gradients to other nodes. For the centralized mode, the gradients first get aggregated and then delivered back to each node. For decentralized mode, gradients are exchanged between neighboring nodes.
In many scenarios, the training data is privacy-sensitive. For example, a patient's medical condition can not to be shared across hospitals. To avoid the sensitive information being leaked, collaborative learning has recently emerged [16, 17, 25] where two or more participants can jointly train a model while the training dataset never leave each participants' local server. Only the gradients are shared across the network. This technique has been used to train models for medical treatments across multiple hospitals [17] , analyze patient survival situations from various countries [16] and build predictive keyboards to improve typing experience [4, 19, 25] .
"Shallow" Leakage from Gradients
Previous work explored that it's possible to steal the information from gradients. For some layers, previous find the gradients already reveal certain information. For example, the embedding layer in language task only produces gradients for words occurred in training data, which reveals what words have been used in other participant's training set [26] . But such leakage is shallow. They are not pixel-wise in vision tasks nor token-wise in language tasks. Another case is fully connected layers, where observations of gradient updates can be used to infer output feature values. However, this cannot extend to convolutional layers because the size of the features is far larger than the size of weights.
Some recent works develop learning-based methods to infer properties of the batch. They show that a binary classifier trained on gradients is able to determine whether an exact data record (membership inference [26, 32] ) or a data record with certain properties (property inference [26] ) is included in the other participant's' batch. Furthermore, they train GAN models [9] to synthesis images look similar to training data from the gradient [8, 12, 26] , but the attack is limited and only works when all class members look alike.
Method
We show that it's possible to steal an image pixel-wise and steal a sentence token-wise from the gradients. We focus on the standard synchronous distributed training: at each step t, every node i samples a minibatch (x t,i , y t,i ) from its own dataset to compute the gradients:
The gradients are communicated across the network and gets averaged, which then update the weights:
Given gradients ∇W t,k received from other participant k, we aim to steal participant k's training data (x t,k , y t,k ). F () and W t are shared by default.
[0. The overview of our DLG algorithm. Variables to be updated are marked with a bold border. While normal participants calculate ∇W to update parameter using its private training data, the malicious attacker updates its dummy inputs and labels to minimize the gradients distance. When the optimization finishes, the evil user is able to obtain the training set from honest participants. 
Initialize dummy inputs and labels.
3:
for i ← 1 to n do
4:
∇W t ← ∂ (F (x t , W t ), y t )/∂W t Compute dummy gradients.
5:
D ← ||∇W − ∇W || 2 6:
Update data to match gradients.
7:
end for 8: return x n+1 , y n+1 9: end procedure
The Training Data Leakage via Gradients Matching
To recover the data from gradients, we first randomly initialize a dummy input x and label input y . We then feed these "dummy data" into models and get "dummy gradients".
Optimizing the dummy gradients close as to original also makes the dummy data close to the real training data (the trends shown in Fig. 5 . Given gradients at a certain step, we obtain the training data by minimizing the following objective
The distance ||∇W − ∇W || 2 is differentiable w.r.t dummy inputs x and labels y can thus can be optimized using standard gradient-based methods. Note that this optimization requires 2 nd order derivatives. We make a mild assumption that F is twice differentiable, which holds for the majority of modern machine learning models (e.g., most neural networks) and tasks. 
Deep Leakage for Batched Data
The algo. 1 works well when there is only a single pair of input and label in the batch. However when we naively apply it to the case where batch size N ≥ 1, the algorithm would be too slow to converge. We think the reason is that same batched data can have many different permutations; therefore there are N ! satisfactory solutions which make optimizer hard to choose gradient directions. To force the optimization closer to a solution, instead of updating the whole batch, we update a single training sample instead. We modify the line 6 in algo. 1 to :
Then we can observe fast and stable convergence. We list the iterations required for convergence for different batch sizes in Tab. 1 and provide visualized results in Fig. 3 . ResNet-20  270  602  1173  2711  Table 1 : The iterations required for restore batched data on CIFAR [20] dataset. The deep leakage becomes harder when batch size increases.
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Experiments
Setup. Implementing algorithm. 1 requires to calculate the high order gradients and we choose PyTorch [28] as our experiment platform. We use L-BFGS [24] with learning rate 1, history size 100 and max iterations 20 and optimize for 1200 iterations and 100 iterations for image and text task respectively. More task-specific details can be found in following sub-sections.
Deep Leakage on Image Classification
Given an image containing objects, images classification aims to determine the class of the item. We experiment our algorithm on modern CNN architectures ResNet-56 [11] and pictures from MNIST [21] , CIFAR [20] , SVHN [27] and LFW [13] . One change we have made to the models is replacing activation ReLU to Sigmoid, as our algorithm requires the model to be twice-differentiable. For image labels, instead of directly optimizing the discrete categorical values, we random initialize a vector with shape N × C where N is the batch size and C is the number of classes, and then take its softmax output as the one-hot label for optimization.
The leaking process is visualized in Fig. 4 . We start with random Gaussian noise (first column) and try to match the gradients produced by the dummy data and real ones. As shown in Fig 5, minimizing Iters=0 Iters=10 Iters=50 Iters=100 Iters=500 Melis [26] Ground Truth Figure 4 : The visualization showing the deep leakage on images from MNIST [21] , CIFAR [20] , SVHN [27] and LFW [13] respectively. Our algorithm fully recovers the four images while previous work only succeed on images with clean background. the distance between gradients also reduces the gap between data. We observe that monochrome images with a clean background (MNIST) are easiest to recover, while complex images like face take more iterations to recover (Fig. 4) . When the optimization finishes, the recover results are almost identical to ground truth images, despite few negligible artifact pixels.
We visually compare the results from other method [26] and ours in Fig. 4 . The previous method uses GAN models when the class label is given and only works well on MNIST. The result on SVHN, though is still visually recognizable as text "9", this is no longer the original training image. The cases are even worse on LFW and collapse on CIFAR. We also make a numerical comparison by performing leaking and measuring the MSE on all dataset images in Fig. 6 . Images are normalized to the range [0, 1] and our algorithm appears much better results (ours < 0.03 v.s. previous > 0.2) on all four datasets.
Deep Leakage on Masked Language Model
For language task, we verify our algorithm on Masked Language Model(MLM) task. In each sequence, 15% of the words are replaced with a [MASK] token and MLM model attempts to predict the original value of the masked words from a given context. We choose BERT [7] as our backbone and adapt hyperparameters from the official implementation * .
Different from vision tasks where inputs are continuous RGB values, language models preprocess discrete words into embeddings. We apply our algorithm on embeddings and minimize the gradients Example 2 Example 3 Initial Sentence tilting fill given **less word **itude fine **nton overheard living vegas **vac **vation *f forte **dis cerambycidae ellison **don yards marne **kali toni **enting asbestos cutler km nail **oof **dation **ori righteous **xie lucan **hot **ery at **tle ordered pa **eit smashing proto we welcome proposals for tutor **ials on either core machine learning topics or topics of emerging importance for machine learning .
we invite submissions for the thirty -third annual conference on neural information processing systems .
Original Text
Registration, volunteer applications, and student travel application open the first week of September. Child care will be available.
We welcome proposals for tutorials on either core machine learning topics or topics of emerging importance for machine learning.
We invite submissions for the Thirty-Third Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. Table 2 : The progress of deep leakage on language tasks. distance between the one produced dummy embeddings and real ones. After optimization finishes, we derive original text by finding the closest entry the embedding matrix.
In Tab. 2, we exhibit the leaking history on three sentences selected from NeurIPS conference page. Similar to the vision task, we start with randomly initialized embedding: the reverse query results at iteration 0 is meaningless. During the optimization, the gradients produced by dummy embedding gradually match the original ones and so the embeddings. In later iterations, part of sequence gradually appears. In example 3, at iteration 20, 'annual conference' appeared and at iteration 30, we have a sentence very similar original text. Though few mismatches caused by the ambiguity in tokenizing, the main content of original training data is already leaked.
Defense Strategies
Noisy Gradients
One straightforward attempt to defense DLG is to add noise on gradients before sharing. To evaluate, we experiment Gaussian and Laplacian noise (widely used in differential privacy studies) distributions with variance range from 10 −1 to 10 −4 and central 0. From Fig. 7a and 7b, we observe that the defense effect mainly depends on the magnitude of distribution variance and less related to the noise types. When variance is at the scale of 10 −4 , the noisy gradients do not prevent the leak. For noise with variance 10 −3 , though with artifacts, the leakage can still be performed. Only when the variance is larger than 10 −2 and the noise is starting affect the accuracy, DLG will fail to execute. We also notice that Laplacian tends to slightly a better defense when both at scale 10 −3 .
Another common perturbation on gradients is half precision, which was initially designed to save memory footprints and widely used to reduce communication bandwidth. We test two popular half precision implementations IEEE float16 (Single-precision floating-point format) and bfloat16 (Brain Floating Point [33] , a truncated version of 32 bit float). Shown in Fig. 7c , unfortunately, both half precision failed to protect the training data. 
